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INTRODUCTION
To determine the cognizability of a purported social group for
asylum relief, all circuits1 consider the framework set out by the Board

 J.D. candidate, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
By circuit: See, e.g., Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993);
Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239-40 (3d
Cir. 1993); Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2004), reh’g granted
en banc, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 29561 (4th Cir. Jan. 13, 2005); Ontunez-Tursios v.
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 352 (5th Cir. 2002); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d
533, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2003), modified on other grounds, Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales,
453 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir. 2006); Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998);
Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2008); Hernandez-Montiel,
225 F.3d 1084, 1091-93 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled in part, in part, on other grounds,
Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded,
Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 119899 (10th Cir. 2005); Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1196-97 (11th Cir.
2006).
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of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in Matter of Acosta.2 There, the BIA
stated that the asylum applicant may establish membership in a
particular social group if the applicant “is a member of a group of
persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”3 An
immutable characteristic is either unchangeable or so fundamental to
one’s identity or conscience such that the person should not be
required to change.4 That immutable characteristic “might be an innate
one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it
might be a shared past experience.”5 Despite the BIA’s inclusion of
“sex”6 as an immutable characteristic, few circuits have recognized the
possibility of a cognizable social group based on gender7 alone,
specifically, a social group of women.8 But, a number of circuits have
2

Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled, in part, on
other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
3
Id. at 233.
4
Id.
5
Id. (emphasis added).
6
Sex refers to “the male or female division of a species, especially as
differentiated with reference to the reproductive functions.” SEX DEFINITION,
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sex (last visited Dec. 11,
2013). Gender refers to “[s]exual identity, especially in relation to society or
culture.” GENDER DEFINITION, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/gender (last visited Dec. 11, 2013). This
Comment uses the terms interchangeably, and specifically refers to the state of being
female.
7
Even if gender can be changed, it is still immutable under Acosta because
gender “is a characteristic so fundamental to identity that no one should have to
change it.” Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in
Defining a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims
Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 88 (2008).
8
See, e.g., Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005)
(acknowledging that females might constitute a particular social group in some
circumstances and that Acosta “listed gender as an example of a prototypical
immutable characteristic that could form the basis for a social group”); Fatin v. INS,
12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting Acosta “specifically mentioned sex as an
innate characteristic that could link the members of the particular social group[,]
[t]hus to the extent that [Fatin] suggests that she would be persecuted or has a wellfounded fear that she would be persecuted . . . simply because she is a woman, she
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recognized social groups defined by gender and one or more
characteristics.9
In Cece v. Holder, the en banc Seventh Circuit recognized that the
formulation of “gender plus one or more narrowing characteristics” is
a legitimate method to form a cognizable social group.10 Other circuits
and the BIA have found cognizable gender plus social groups, with the
plus being characteristics making the asylum applicant particularly
vulnerable to persecution, such as “nationality, ethnicity, tribal
affiliation, age, religion, marital or relationship/status, family
membership (“kinship ties”), education level, absence of male
protection, opposition to abuse, or transgression of social/cultural
norms.”11 The gender plus approach is supported domestically and
internationally.12
has identified a cognizable social group.”); but see Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664
(2d Cir. 1991) (stating that “[p]ossession of a broadly-based characteristics such as
youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with membership in a
particular social group.”).
9
See, e.g., Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding
“women in Guatemala” could be a cognizable social group); Gomez-Zuluaga v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 345 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding “women who have
escaped involuntary servitude after being abducted and confined by the FARC” were
a cognizable social group); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005)
(concluding female tribal members constituted a cognizable social group); Fatin, 12
F.3d at 1241 (concluding Iranian women refusing to conform to gender-specific laws
and social norms were a cognizable social group).
10
Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 676 (7th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Cece II] (en
banc).
11
Natalie Nanasi, Lessons from Matter of A-T-: Guidance for Practitioners
Litigating Asylum Cases Involving a Spectrum of Gender-Based Harms, From
Female Genital Mutilation to Forced Marriage and Beyond, 12-02 IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS 1 (Feb. 2012).
12
See Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Considerations for Asylum Officers
Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women, (May 26, 1995), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/65633.htm.; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines
on International Protection: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the
Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees. P 12, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002), available
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3d36f23f4.html.
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Historically, women pursuing gender-based asylum claims have
faced significant barriers for three main reasons: (1) the harms women
experienced were not considered persecution because their culture or
religion either condoned or required the harms, the harms
disproportionately affected women, or the harms were different than
those experienced by men in similar circumstances; (2) non-State
actors, like relatives or members of the community perpetrated the
harms; and (3) women are often persecuted on account of gender,
which is not one of the five protected grounds.13 Even though women
and children are significantly overrepresented in the world’s refugee
population,14 the difficulty women face fitting into one of the
protected grounds causes them to constitute the minority of successful
asylum claims.15
The Acosta decision showed promise of expanding the definition
of social group to include gender as a cognizable social group – a
promise that asylum jurisprudence has largely not realized.16 No
consensus exists among courts regarding the use of gender in defining
a social group.17 The BIA and circuits are reluctant to accept gender as
the basis of the social group formulation absent another qualifying

13

Karen Musalo, Beyond Belonging: Challenging the Boundaries of
Nationality: Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A
Unifying Rational for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 781-82
(2003). Also, the anti-immigrant climate of U.S. immigration policy over the last
century partly explains resistance to gender-based asylum claims. Karen Musalo,
Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or Call to
(Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 130-31 (2007) [hereinafter
Protecting Victims].
14
Melanie Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against
Women: A Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum
Claims Based on Gender Persecution, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 286 (2002).
15
Elizabeth A. Hueben, Domestic Violence and Asylum Law: The United
States Takes Several Remedial Steps in Recognizing Gender-Based Persecution, 70
UMKC L. REV. 453, 453 (2001).
16
Randall, supra note 14, at 294.
17
Lisa C. Chan, Everything in Moderation: Why Any Gender Nexus under U.S.
Asylum Law Must be Strictly Limited in Scope, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 169, 188 (2011).
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characteristic.18 This reluctance to accept gender-based social groups
is due to the concern that “half a nation’s residents [can] obtain asylum
on the ground that women are persecuted there.”19 Accordingly, courts
have narrowly construed social group formulations to control refugee
numbers.20 But, “the size and breadth of a group alone does not
preclude a group from qualifying as a social group.”21
Narrow construction of the social group ground, the most widely
used and applicable ground for gender-based asylum claims, has left
women unable to utilize social groups defined in whole or in part by
gender.22 This has led to an under-inclusive effect in granting asylum
to women.23 Even when a gender-based social group is found
cognizable, it is based on convoluted logic.24 The protected grounds of
race, religion, and nationality are broadly defined; therefore, the social
group ground should similarly be broadly defined.25

18

Jesse Imbriano, Opening the Floodgates or Filling the Gap?: Perdomo v.
Holder Advances the Ninth Circuit One Step Closer to Recognizing Gender-Based
Asylum Claims, 56 VILL. L. REV. 327, 330 (2011).
19
Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005). Annually, the
President of the United States, consulting with Congress, establishes an overall
ceiling for refugee admissions and regional allocations before the beginning of the
fiscal year. Daniel C. Martin & James E. Yankay, Refugees and Asylees: 2012,
Office Immigr. Stat., DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Apr. 2013), at 2. For
example, the overall ceiling for refugee admissions was 76,000 in 2012. Id.
20
Stephanie Kaye Bell, Adjudication of Gender Persecution Cases Under the
Canada Guidelines: The United States Has No Reason to Fear an Onslaught of
Asylum Claims, 20 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMP. REG. 655, 659 (1995).
21
Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010); see Cece II, 733 F.3d
662, 673 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“The breadth of the social group says nothing
about the requirements for asylum.”).
22
Stacey Kounelias, Asylum Law and Female Genital Mutilation:
“Membership in a Particular Social Group:” Inadequately Protecting Persecuted
Women, 11 SCHOLAR 577, 597 (2009).
23
Aimee Heitz, Providing a Pathway to Asylum: Re-interpreting “Social
Group to Include Gender, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 213, 215 (2013).
24
Randall, supra note 14, at 294.
25
Imbriano, supra note 18, at 353.
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Narrow construction of gender-based social groups requires
female applicants to narrowly define their social group, making the
social group ground unlike the other protected grounds.26 Even though
the social group ground was intended to provide asylum relief to those
who did not fit into the other protected grounds, the ground has always
been narrowly construed.27 Acosta strikes a balance between
expanding the social group ground beyond relief provided by the other
four protected grounds and applying the ground so broadly that the
requirement becomes inconsequential.28
The BIA should return to its conclusion in Acosta that gender is
an immutable characteristic defining a social group.29 The BIA and
circuits require the plus characteristics to also be immutable for gender
plus social groups. In Cece v. Holder, the court held Cece was a
member of a cognizable social group “united by the common and
immutable characteristic [sic] of being (1) young, (2) Albanian, (3)
women, (4) living alone.”30 Because the BIA already held gender is an
immutable characteristic,31 applicants should not be required to prove
the plus characteristics are immutable as well. Gender alone should be
the immutable characteristic, and the issue should be whether the plus
characteristics narrow the group sufficiently so that group members
can establish the nexus between group membership and persecution.32
Part I of this Comment explains the requirements of establishing
asylum eligibility. Part II discusses establishing the protected ground
26

Id.
Heitz, supra note 23, at 215.
28
Imbriano, supra note 18, at 345.
29
Id. at 359.
30
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 672 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
31
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled, in part,
on other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
32
See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199–1200 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
focus with respect to such claims should be not on whether either gender constitutes
a social group (which both certainly do) but on whether the members of that group
are sufficiently likely to be persecuted that one could say that they are persecuted ‘on
account of’ their membership.”); Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2006),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007) (same).
27
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of membership in a particular social group. Part III summarizes the
background, panel opinion, and en banc opinion of Cece v. Holder.
Part IV addresses the circuit split created by Cece v. Holder. Part V
outlines representative cases where gender plus social groups were
found cognizable and analogizes the cases’ facts and reasoning to Cece
v. Holder. Part VI, inter alia, proposes a judicial interpretation of
gender-based social group formulations that will assist in creating
uniformity of interpreting the cognizability of gender-based social
groups and increasing protection for persecuted women.
I.

ESTABLISHING REFUGEE STATUS

An alien must establish she is a refugee within the meaning of the
Immigration and Nationality Act33 to obtain asylum, meaning she is
unable or unwilling to return to her country due to past persecution or
a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.34 Congress did not define persecution. Thus, the BIA and the
circuits define persecution on a case by case basis.35
The BIA defines persecution broadly as “the infliction of suffering
or harm, under government sanction, upon persons who differ in a way
regarded as offensive (e.g., race, religion, political opinion, etc.), in a
manner condemned by civilized governments.”36 Most circuits broadly
define persecution as well.37 The Seventh Circuit listed actions that
33

8 U.S.C § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).
35
See Topalli v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 128, 132 (1st Cir. 2005).
36
Matter of Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 456-57, rev’d on other grounds,
750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985).
37
By circuit: Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 570 (1st Cir. 1999)
(“[P]ersecution encompasses more than threats to life or freedom . . . but less than
mere harassment or annoyance.”) (citations omitted); Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[P]ersecution is the infliction of suffering
or harm upon those who differ on the basis of a protected statutory ground.”)
(citation omitted); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (“‘[P]ersecution’
[includes] threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe
34

156

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

7

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 9, Issue 1

Fall 2013

constitute past persecution, including “detention, arrest, interrogation,
prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of property,
surveillance, beatings, or torture.”38 Establishing past persecution
creates the rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future
persecution,39 which the government can rebut by showing changed
conditions in the alien’s home country such that the alien no longer has
a well-founded fear40 or that internal relocation is reasonable.41
Absent past persecution, asylum may be granted if the alien
demonstrates a well-founded fear of persecution.42 The alien must
show her fear of persecution is “subjectively genuine and objectively
reasonable.”43 The United States Supreme Court stated that a “wellthat they constitute a threat to life or freedom.”); Abdel-Masieh v. U.S. INS, 73 F.3d
579, 583 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[P]ersecution . . . is . . . ‘the infliction of suffering or
harm, under government sanction, upon persons who differ in a way regarded as
offensive . . . in a manner condemned by civil governments.”) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted); De Souza v. INS, 999 F.2d 1156, 1158 (7th Cir.
1993) (“‘[P]ersecution’ . . . [is] punishment or . . . infliction of harm for political,
religious, or other reasons that [the U.S.] does not recognize as legitimate.”) (citation
omitted); Regalado-Garcia v. INS, 305 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Persecution
is the infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.”) (citation omitted); Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1171
(9th Cir. 2005) (“Persecution is the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who
differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive.”)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Chaib v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d
1273, 1277 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Persecution is the infliction of suffering or harm upon
those who differ . . . in a way regarded as offensive and requires more than just
restrictions or threats to life and liberty.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
38
Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
39
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).
40
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A).
41
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(B).
42
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b).
43
Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001); see DiazEscobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The objective component
ensures that the alien's subjective fear is ‘well-founded’ in fact and not in fantasy . . .
What is critical is that the alien prove his fear is subjectively genuine and objectively
reasonable.”) (citation omitted).
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founded” fear of an event occurring does not mean it must be “more
likely than not” an event will occur.44 To satisfy the objective wellfounded fear requirement, the alien must demonstrate she will be
singled out for persecution.45 Alternatively, the alien can show those
similarly situated to her are targeted for persecution by establishing
that: (1) in her home country, there is a pattern or practice of
persecuting persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of
one of the protected grounds; and (2) she is in one of those groups, and
thus her fear is reasonable.46
Finally, the alien must show a nexus between one of the five
protected grounds and the past persecution or fear of future
persecution, meaning the past persecution or fear of future persecution
is “on account of” a protected ground.47 “On account of” means the
protected ground must be “at least one central reason” for the
persecution.48 The alien must also establish that her persecutor is
aware or could become aware of her association to the protected

44

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (“One can certainly have
a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50% chance of
the occurrence taking place.”).
45
Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 852-53 (9th Cir. 1994); see 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(b)(2).
46
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(2)(i)-(ii).
47
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 542 (7th Cir.
2011) (citation omitted). Establishing a nexus is a two-step analysis that requires
identifying the relevant protected ground, then establishing the causal connection
between that ground and persecution. Meghan Casey, Refugee Women as Cultural
Others: Constructing Social Group and Nexus for FGM, Sex Trafficking, and
Domestic Violence Asylum Claims in the United States, 10 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC.
JUST. 981, 1006 (2012).
48
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Previously, courts used a mixed motive
analysis, where the persecutor must be motivated “at least in part” by a protected
ground. See, e.g., Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 170 (3d Cir. 2003); Girma v.
INS, 283 F.3d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 2002), superseded by statute, REAL ID Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732,
735-36 (9th Cir. 1999), superseded by statute, REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231 (2005), as recognized in, Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555
F.3d 734, 739-740 (9th Cir. 2009).
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ground.49 Finally, the alien must be found credible.50 If granted
asylum, the alien may remain indefinitely in the U.S.51
II.

FORMULATING A COGNIZABLE SOCIAL GROUP52

To establish refugee status based on social group membership, the
alien must: "(1) identify a particular social group; (2) establish that
[s]he is a member of that group; and (3) establish that [her] past
persecution or well-founded fear of persecution is based on [her]
membership in that group."53 The BIA first defined a social group in
Matter of Acosta. There, the BIA stated a social group is a group
whose members "share a common, immutable characteristic."54 An
immutable characteristic is a characteristic that is either "beyond the
power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to individual
identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed."55
All circuits currently rely on the Acosta analysis.56 Further, the
purported social group must be defined with particularity.57
49

Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987).
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012).
51
8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(A). The right to remain in the U.S. may be revoked
under certain circumstances. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2).
52
This Comment only addresses gender and the protected ground of
membership in a particular social group. But, refugee status can be based on one
ground or a combination of grounds. See Osorio v. INS., 18 F.3d 1017, 1027 (2d
Cir. 1994). Also, a gender-based asylum claim may fall under protected grounds
other than membership in a particular social group. Chan, supra note 17, at 185. This
Comment does not address asylum claims based on race, nationality, religion, or
political opinion. Further, this Comment does not address other requirements to
qualify as a refugee, including demonstrating past persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution based on a protected ground and being credible.
53
Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 545 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
54
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled, in part,
on other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
55
Id. at 233-34.
56
See cases cited supra note 1.
57
Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008) (“[T]he key
question is whether the proposed description is sufficiently particular, or is too
50
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Shortly after Acosta was decided, the Ninth Circuit declined to
follow the Acosta definition and instead defined a social group as "a
collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are
actuated by some common impulse or interest."58 To meet that
definition, a current or former voluntary association of the group’s
members must exist imparting "some common characteristic that is
fundamental to their identity as a member of that . . . group."59 The
Ninth Circuit later changed its social group definition to encompass
Acosta's immutability requirement by stating that the group members
must be united by a current or former voluntary association or an
innate characteristic that is so fundamental to its members’ identities
or consciences that they cannot or should not be required to change
it.60
The Second Circuit added a visibility requirement to the Acosta
definition, meaning the social group members must share an
immutable or fundamental characteristic making them identifiable to
potential persecutors.61 Because the social group definitions in some
circuits differed from the Acosta definition, the BIA clarified the
definition in Matter of C-A- by reaffirming the Acosta definition,
rejecting the Ninth Circuit's voluntary associational relationship
definition, and approving the Second Circuit's visibility requirement.62
The BIA termed the Second Circuit's visibility definition “social
visibility” and added it as a relevant factor in the social group
analysis.63 Later, the BIA added social visibility as a requirement to
amorphous to create a benchmark for determining group membership.”) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
59
Id.
60
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 n.6 (9th Cir. 2000),
overruled in part, in part, on other grounds, Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177
(9th Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded, Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006).
61
Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007).
62
Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 955-57 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom.
Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006).
63
Id. at 959-61.
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form a cognizable social group.64 Most circuits accepted the BIA's
inclusion of social visibility as a requirement to establish membership
in a particular social group.65 Social visibility is broadly defined as
requiring that "the relevant trait be potentially identifiable by members
of the community, either because it is evident or because the
information defining the characteristic is publicly accessible.”66 The
Third Circuit and Seventh Circuit rejected the social visibility
requirement as inconsistent with past BIA decisions.67

64

Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73-74 (B.I.A. 2007)
(concluding “wealthy Guatemalans” were not a cognizable social group because the
group lacked social visibility). The social visibility requirement may inhibit a female
applicant’s ability to present a cognizable social group because “one tactic of
persecution is to force a subjugated group [like women] to remain invisible.” Marisa
Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger: Separation Violence as a
Basis for Refugee Protection for Battered Women, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 370
(2009).
65
By circuit: Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009); UceloGomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Al-Ghorbani v.
Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 994 (6th Cir. 2009); Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624,
628–29 (8th Cir. 2008); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 858–62 (9th Cir.
2009); Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 648 (10th Cir. 2012); CastilloArias, 446 F.3d at 1197–98.
66
Rivera-Barrientos, 666 F.3d at 652. The BIA has not adequately defined
social visibility, which has led to disparity and an unlimited amount of discretion in
its definition. Heitz, supra note 23, at 235.
67
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 2011)
(stating the social visibility requirement “is an unreasonable addition to the
requirements for establishing refugee status where that status turns upon persecution
on account of membership in a particular social group”); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.2d
611, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting the inconsistency of the BIA’s use of the social
visibility requirement and citing cases where the BIA found a cognizable social
group absent referencing the group’s social visibility).
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III. CECE V. HOLDER
A.

Background

Johanna Cece (“Cece”), an Albanian citizen, entered the U.S. as a
twenty three year old in 2002.68 She used a fraudulent Italian passport
to enter the U.S. under the Visa Waiver Program.69 Within a year of
her entry, she applied for asylum and withholding of removal.70 In
addition to her fear of persecution based on her religion (as an
Orthodox Christian) and her political opinion (supporting the
Democratic party), she also feared persecution as a young woman
living alone at risk of being kidnapped and forced into prostitution.71
The last mentioned fear of persecution has fueled the contention
among various appellate levels regarding the formulation of a
cognizable social group.
After Cece’s parents left Albania in 2001, Cece lived alone in the
city of Korçë.72 In 2001, a gang leader named Reqi began harassing
Cece by asking her out on dates, offering her rides, and stalking her
throughout Korçë.73 Reqi’s gang was known for forcing women into
prostitution rings, trafficking drugs, and murdering other gang
members.74 Cece ignored Reqi’s advances.75 On June 4, 2001, Reqi
68

Cece I, 668 F.3d 510, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, Cece II, 733
F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
69
Id. Italy is a participant of the Visa Waiver Program; Albania is not. See 8
C.F.R § 217.2(a).
70
Id. at 512. An alien must apply for asylum within one year of her last arrival
in the U.S. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012). A late filing is excused if the alien
demonstrates changed circumstances materially affecting asylum eligibility or
extraordinary circumstances directly related to her failure to apply within one year. 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (2012). To qualify for withholding of removal, the alien
must meet a higher burden of proof – that it is more likely than not that the alien
would be persecuted on account of one of the five protected grounds. 8 U.S.C. §
1231.
71
Cece I, 668 F.3d at 512.
72
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 666.
73
Id.
74
Id.
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followed Cece into a cosmetics store and pinned her against a wall,
refusing to let her go.76 Reqi questioned why she would not go out
with him, making it clear “he could not be stopped and that he would
find her and do whatever he wanted to her.”77 None of the customers
aided Cece.78
Cece reported the incident to the police, who claimed she lacked
proof and took no action.79 Several days later, someone threw a rock
through Cece’s window.80 For her safety, Cece moved 120 miles north
to the city of Tirana where her sister lived in a university dormitory.81
Her sister left Albania the following year.82 Cece then left Albania
because as a young woman living alone, Cece feared she was a target
for kidnapping and forced prostitution.83
Dr. Bernd Fischer, an expert on Albania and Professor in Balkan
History, testified on Cece’s behalf at her hearing before the
immigration judge.84 Dr. Fischer explained the grave problem of
human trafficking for prostitution by Albanian gangs who are often
protected by the police.85 The 2004 U.S. Department of State reports

75

Cece I, 668 F.3d at 512.
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 666-67.
77
Id. at 667.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Cece I, 668 F.3d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, Cece II, 733 F.3d
662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc); see Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667 (noting the immigration
judge’s conclusions that “Albania stands out in Europe as a major country of origin
of traffickers in prostitution; the government’s judicial system is not effective against
the problem; Albania suffers from a major and ongoing trafficking of young women
by gangs; and there is no prospect in the foreseeable future of the government being
able or willing to address the problem.”).
76
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corroborated his testimony.86 Dr. Fischer explained that gangs target
women between the ages of sixteen and twenty six, but force many
women outside that age range into prostitution as well.87 A single
woman living alone, he testified, is particularly vulnerable to
trafficking, especially if previously pursued by a gang member.88 He
emphasized the Albanian government could not protect women from
forced prostitution because law enforcement often either protects or
assists the gangs.89 The prevalence of trafficking nationwide prevented
Cece from relocating safely within Albania, Dr. Fischer asserted.90
In 2006, the immigration judge granted Cece asylum, concluding
she belonged to the social group of “young women who are targeted
for prostitution by traffickers in Albania.”91 On appeal, the BIA
vacated the immigration judge’s decision, concluding (1) Cece did not
establish past persecution; (2) Cece relocated successfully within
Albania; and (3) Cece did not identify a cognizable social group.92
Specifically, Cece’s social group failed because the group members
lacked social visibility and “a narrowing characteristic other than the
risk of being persecuted.”93 On remand, the immigration judge
deferred to the BIA’s conclusion that Cece was not a member of a
cognizable social group.94 The immigration judge reluctantly accepted
the BIA’s finding that Cece could successfully relocate within

86

Cece I, 668 F.3d at 512. Courts generally regard State Department reports as
reliable. El Moraghy v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195, 204 (1st Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted).
87
Cece II, 733 F. 3d at 667. Cece was twenty three years old when she entered
the U.S. in 2002. Cece I, 668 F.3d at 512. As such, when the immigration judge
granted her asylum in 2006, she was either twenty six or twenty seven years old.
Cece II, 733 F. 3d at 667.
88
Cece I, 668 F.3d at 512.
89
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667.
90
Cece I, 668 F.3d at 512.
91
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667.
92
Id. at 668.
93
Id.
94
Id.
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Albania.95 The BIA dismissed Cece’s second appeal by emphasizing
Cece’s purported social group “was defined in large part by the harm
inflicted on its members and did not exist independently of the
traffickers.”96 The BIA noted again that internal relocation was
reasonable.97 Cece then appealed to the Seventh Circuit.98
B.

The Panel Opinion

In an opinion authored by Judge Daniel Manion and joined by
Judge Frank Easterbrook, the panel denied Cece’s petition for review,
affirming the BIA’s findings that Cece was not a member of a
cognizable social group and Cece could relocate safely within
Albania.99 The panel stated that members of a social group “must
share a common immutable or fundamental characteristic beyond the
risk, past or present, of harm.”100 On appeal, Cece argued the BIA
erred by concluding members of the purported social group were
united only by persecution suffered in the past; Cece argued the
members of the proposed group were united by a present risk of
persecution.101 The panel stated the members of Cece’s purported
social group had “little or nothing in common beyond being
targets.”102 Further, Cece failed to establish asylum eligibility because
of (1) her fraudulent entry into the U.S.; (2) her failure to demonstrate
she would be singled out for persecution; and (3) her failure to
demonstrate she could not relocate within Albania.103
95

Id.
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. An asylum applicant seeks review of a BIA decision by the circuit with
jurisdiction over the geographical area where the immigration judge completed
proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2).
99
Cece I, 668 F.3d 510, 511-14 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, Cece II, 733
F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
100
Id. at 513 (emphasis in original).
101
Id.
102
Id. (quoting Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009)).
103
Id. at 513-14.
96
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Judge Ilana Rovner104 dissented, disagreeing with the panel’s
conclusion that the purported social group was defined solely by harm
suffered by its members.105 Another characteristic besides being
targets united the purported social group, specifically, “the common
and immutable characteristic of being women between the ages of
sixteen and twenty-seven who meet the profile of traffickers.”106 To
illustrate, Judge Rovner listed cases finding a cognizable social group
even though the members shared the characteristic of being targets of
persecution.107 Accordingly, using persecution as one characteristic in
a social group definition does not foreclose finding a cognizable social
group.108 Judge Rovner noted the uniqueness of Albania and the
problem of sex trafficking due to the country’s economic, political,
and legal instability.109
Despite the prevalence of trafficking, however, Judge Rovner
explained a generalized fear would not be a viable asylum claim.110
Cece was special: (1) she lived alone in a country where women do
not commonly live alone; (2) Cece was in the target age group of
women most at risk for forced prostitution; and (3) a gang leader
targeted her already and the police refused to help.111 Judge Rovner
would have remanded to the immigration judge regarding two asylum
eligibility issues: (1) Cece was no longer within her expert’s target age
group of women at risk for forced prostitution, and (2) Judge Rovner
and the immigration judge expressed doubt regarding the BIA’s
conclusion that Cece could relocate safely considering the BIA failed
to recognize that Cece lived with her sister when she relocated
104

Judge Rovner and her parents fled Latvia before the Nazi occupation.
William Hageman, Remarkable Woman: Ilana Rovner, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 25, 2011,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-11-25/features/ct-tribu-remarkable-rovner20111125_1_latvia-nazis-ship.
105
Cece I, 668 F.3d at 514 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
106
Id.
107
Id. at 514-15.
108
See id.
109
Id. at 515.
110
Id.
111
Id.
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successfully within Albania.112 Cece filed a petition for rehearing en
banc; the Seventh Circuit granted her petition and vacated the panel’s
opinion.113
C.

En Banc Opinion

1.

Majority Opinion

The remaining Seventh Circuit judges agreed with Judge Rovner,
with Judge Rovner writing the en banc opinion and Judge Manion and
Judge Easterbrook writing dissenting opinions.114 The court held Cece
was a member of a cognizable social group “united by the common
and immutable characteristic [sic] of being (1) young, (2) Albanian,
(3) women, (4) living alone.”115 The age, gender, nationality, or living
situation of the group members’ are not alterable.116 To begin, the
court discussed defining a social group.117 The Seventh Circuit follows
the Acosta social group definition 118: membership in a particular
social group is defined by “a characteristic that is either immutable or
is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that a person
ought not be required to be changed.”119
The court found that Cece and the immigration judge articulated
the relevant social group.120 Nonetheless, the court noted that the
112

Id.
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 672.
116
Id. at 673.
117
Id. at 669-71.
118
Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998).
119
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 669 (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211,
233-34 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled, in part, on other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi,
19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987)).
120
Id. at 670. Per Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (per curiam) and
INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam), “[a]n appellate court errs
by deciding in the first instance, without giving the [BIA] the first opportunity on
remand, whether a proposed social group is cognizable.” Id. at 677. In his dissent,
113
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immigration judge omitted the crucial characteristic of living alone as
part the relevant social group.121 Cece’s asylum application asserted
she was the “perfect target” because she was young and living alone,
Cece’s testimony emphasized that it is uncommon for women to live
alone in Albania and she was afraid to do so, and the expert’s
testimony addressed the risk of women living alone in Albania.122
Accordingly, the court declared the immigration judge’s definitions of
Cece’s social group (first as “young women who are targeted for
prostitution by traffickers in Albania,” then “women in danger of
being trafficked as prostitutes”) “shorthand for describing women
vulnerable to trafficking.”123 This formulation conformed to the court’s
observation that an immutable or fundamental characteristic forming a
cognizable social group can include “membership in a group whose
ideas or practices run counter to the cultural or social convention of
the country.”124
The court found that contrary to the BIA and panel’s opinions,
Cece’s social group was not defined solely by the harm inflicted, as
the social group of young women living alone in Albania existed
independently of the traffickers.125 The group members shared the
immutable or fundamental characteristics of being: (1) young, (2)
female, and (3) living alone.126 For support, the court cited precedent
for the assertion that a purported social group may still be cognizable
even if partly defined by the persecution; it just cannot be defined
solely by the persecution.127 The court derived its conclusion from the

Judge Manion argued the BIA should be afforded the first opportunity to determine
whether the characteristics of “young” and “living alone” could form a cognizable
social group. Id. at 685 (Manion, J. dissenting).
121
Id. at 670 (majority opinion).
122
Id.
123
Id. at 671.
124
Id. at 669.
125
Id. at 677.
126
Id. at 672.
127
Id. at 676.
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reasoning in mixed motive cases.128 Courts look beyond persecution at
the underlying characteristics accounting for fear and vulnerability.129
Next, the court addressed the slippery slope argument of the
dissenters – that defining broad categories of social group
cognizability will lead to asylum eligibility for everyone facing a
safety risk in her home country notwithstanding the reason.130 By
example, the court stated that just because all women and African
Americans are protected under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does
not mean all members of the protected class have a discrimination
claim.131 Besides establishing a cognizable social group, the asylum
applicant must prove a nexus – that she will be persecuted on account
of the membership in a particular social group.132 Thus, even if the
number of members of a cognizable social group were many, fewer
members can establish all statutory asylum eligibility requirements.133
The court listed examples where cognizable social groups had many
members.134
To overcome Chevron135 deference, the court stated the BIA
decision was inconsistent with its similar decisions.136 Accordingly,
the BIA erred by concluding a young woman living alone cannot
128

Id. at 672. See supra text accompanying note 48.
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 672.
130
Id. at 673-74.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 674-75.
134
Id.
135
The BIA's reasonable interpretations of ambiguous terms of the
Immigration and Nationality Act are entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).; see INS v. AguirreAguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999); Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 542 (7th
Cir. 2011) (“Precedential opinions of the [BIA] interpreting the governing legal
standards, or non-precedential decisions of the [BIA] that rely on applicable [BIA]
precedent, are entitled to Chevron deference.”). Congress did not define “social
group,” so the BIA’s interpretation of the term guides courts. Cece II, 733 F.3d at
669.
136
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 676.
129
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constitute a social group.137 For example, in Matter of Kasinga, the
BIA found a cognizable social group of young women of a tribe
practicing female genital mutilation.138 The court did not find that case
distinguishable from Cece’s case because both cases involved a broad
group “narrowed by other changeable but fundamental
characteristics.”139 That narrowing characteristic in Cece’s case is
living alone, rather than experiencing female genital mutilation as in
Matter of Kasinga.140 The court did not decide whether gender alone
could form a cognizable social group.141 But, the court held that
“gender plus one or more narrowing characteristics” could form a
cognizable social group.142
After concluding that Cece proffered a cognizable social group,
the court found the BIA’s conclusion that internal relocation was
reasonable was not supported by substantial evidence.143 Actually, the
BIA’s decision was not supported by any evidence or analysis and the
only discussion on the issue was the immigration judge’s disagreement
with the BIA’s conclusion.144 Instead, the facts supported the
conclusion that internal relocation was unreasonable: (1) Cece lived
safely in Tirana because she lived with her sister; (2) given the small
size of Albania, it would be difficult to hide; (3) throughout Albania,
the norm is for people to live in family or clan groupings; and (4) Cece
was already known to traffickers, and thus at an increased risk of

137

Id. at 677.
Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365-66 (B.I.A. 1996).
139
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 676.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 677-78. The court defers to the BIA’s factual findings unless the
record lacks substantial evidence to support the factual findings. Malek v. INS, 198
F.3d 1016, 1021 (7th Cir. 2000). The standard for substantial evidence is whether the
BIA’s determination “is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence
on the record considered as a whole.” Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 542 (7th Cir.
2011).
144
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 677-78.
138
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being targeted.145 The court granted Cece’s petition for review and
remanded her case.146
2.

Dissenting Opinions

Judge Easterbrook’s dissent addressed the fallacies of the court’s
acceptance of Cece’s social group, namely, that anyone facing a risk of
harm in her home country could point to an alleged immutable
characteristic and establish asylum eligibility, no matter the reason for
the risk of harm.147 In effect, this would skip the issue of establishing a
protected ground and go straight to the issue of whether persecution
occurred, thus not giving effect to all the statutory requirements.148
Judge Easterbrook appeared to question whether Cece had a wellfounded fear of persecution.149 He noted that (1) the number of
Albanian prostitutes is not indicative of how many are in the sex trade
involuntarily; (2) presumably, the number of young women living
alone is Albania is substantially higher than the statistics of Albanian
trafficking victims; (3) the State Department ranks numerous other
countries as having a greater sex trafficking risk than Albania; and (4)
“[d]eplorable as human trafficking is, any given woman’s danger in
Albania may be modest.”150 Judge Easterbrook contended the BIA had
substantial evidence to conclude internal relocation was reasonable
because Cece was not followed or confronted when she moved to
Tirana.151 Further, Judge Easterbrook doubted Cece’s eligibility for
asylum because of the adverse factor of entering the U.S. by fraud
absent imminent danger.152

145

Id.
Id. at 678.
147
Id. at 678-83 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
148
Id. at 680.
149
See id. at 678-79.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 679-80.
152
Id. at 683.
146
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Like Judge Easterbrook, Judge Manion disagreed with the social
group formulation, stating that characteristics like “young” and “living
alone” are not immutable or fundamental characteristics.153 A
characteristic based on age is subjective and subject to manipulation
for the purpose of social group formulation, as shown by Cece’s
expert, who offered a target age group of approximately age 16 to age
27.154 Judge Manion argued the majority erred by considering whether
“young” and “living alone” could be social group characteristics
because the BIA did not consider these characteristics and thus the
court lacked authority to do so, making remand the proper action.155
Regardless, human trafficking is a risk facing all Albanians – men,
women, and children.156 Finally, Judge Manion argued the majority
erred by stating the BIA did not support its decision that internal
relocation was reasonable with substantial evidence because the BIA
analyzed the facts and declared internal relocation was feasible in its
first opinion.157
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Cece v. Holder conflicts with the Sixth Circuit decision Rreshpja
v. Gonzales, which held that young and attractive Albanian women
forced into prostitution were not a cognizable social group.158 Like
Cece, Rreshpja feared returning to Albania because she was at risk for
forced prostitution.159 While living with her aunt in Tirana, Rreshpja
escaped from a man trying to abduct her.160 As she escaped, the man
153

Id. at 684 (Manion, J. dissenting).
Id. at 685. In his dissent, Judge Easterbrook contemplated that “[p]erhaps
Cece looks younger than her age and would be targeted by mistake, but [Cece] does
not argue this.” Cece II, 733 F.3d at 678 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
155
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 685 (Manion, J. dissenting).
156
Id. at 685-86.
157
Id. at 687.
158
Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2005).
159
Id. at 554-55.
160
Id. at 553.
154
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asserted “she should not get too excited because she would end up on
her back in Italy, like many other girls.”161 Perceiving this as a threat
of forced prostitution, Rreshpja and her aunt reported the incident to
the police, who said there was insufficient information to identify or
arrest the man.162 Rreshpja entered the U.S. on a nonimmigrant visa
which was issued based on fraudulent documents.163
The court based its conclusion that young and attractive Albanian
women forced into prostitution did not constitute a cognizable social
group on two reasons.164 First, the proposed group was a too
generalized and sweeping classification, particularly considering
Rreshpja did not demonstrate there was a pervasive practice of forcing
young women into prostitution.165 Second, the social group was
circularly defined by its persecution, as group members did not share a
narrowing characteristic besides the risk of persecution.166 Besides not
establishing a cognizable social group, Rreshpja faced asylum
eligibility problems because (1) she did not prove past persecution nor
did she prove an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution, and
(2) the immigration judge found some of her testimony lacked
credibility.167 Therefore, Rreshpja was denied asylum.168
Cece’s majority rejected the Rreshpja court’s reasoning that the
purported social group of “young-looking, attractive Albanian women
who are forced into prostitution” was too broad and sweeping a
classification.169 The Cece court noted that many social groups
recognized by the BIA and other circuits included broad
characteristics; regardless, a potentially large pool of valid asylum
161

Id.
Id.
163
Id. at 553-54.
164
Id. at 555.
165
Id. at 555-56.
166
Id. at 556.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 556-57. Rreshpja’s applications for withholding of removal and
protection under the Convention against Torture were also denied. Id. at 557.
169
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 675 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
162
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claims is not a basis for rejecting an otherwise cognizable social
group.170 To illustrate, Judge Rovner pointed out that the large number
of ethnic Tutsis in Rwanda (almost 700,000) before they were targeted
for genocide, and six million Jews in Nazi-controlled Europe would
have had valid asylum claims today despite the large size of the
groups.171
Further, while the social group formulations of Cece and Rreshpja
alluded to the persecution suffered by the female group members –
being targeted for prostitution – the group members were not united
solely by persecution they suffer.172 Therefore, the Cece majority
rejected the Rreshpja court’s conclusion that “young (or those who
appear to be young), attractive Albanian women . . . forced into
prostitution” were not a cognizable group because the group was
circularly defined by the persecution suffered.173 Judge Easterbrook’s
dissent referenced the conflicting Rreshpja decision to contend that
Cece’s case was a poor choice to set aside the approach of the BIA and
sister circuits.174
While the majority acknowledged another potentially conflicting
decision only in a footnote,175 Judge Easterbook emphasized the
Second Circuit decision, Gjura v. Holder, in his dissent.176 Like Cece,
Gjura entered the U.S. with a fraudulent Italian passport under the Visa
Waiver Program.177 Gjura feared returning to Albania because she
claimed the Albanian mafia tried to kidnap and force her into
prostitution twice, and her sister and cousin were kidnapped and
murdered.178 Besides finding that Gjura did not establish a nexus
170

Id. at 673-74.
Id. at 674.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 672.
174
Id. at 682-83 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
175
Id. at 672 n.5 (majority opinion).
176
Id. at 683.
177
Gjura v. Holder, 695 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam), withdrawn
and superseded by, 502 Fed. App’x. 91 (2d Cir. 2012).
178
Id.
171

174
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between social group membership and her attacks or that the Albanian
government was unable or unwilling to protect her, the Second Circuit
analyzed her social group formulation.179 Its initial opinion held that
young, unmarried Albanian women were not a cognizable social
group.180 The court followed the reasoning of the Rreshpja court – the
purported social group formulation was too generalized and sweeping
and the group was circularly defined by its persecution.181
Gjura v. Holder was decided after the Cece panel opinion but
before the panel opinion was vacated. While the Second Circuit agreed
with the Sixth Circuit’s social group reasoning in Rreshpja, the Second
Circuit stated: “Gjura’s proposed social group differs from, and is more
amporphous [sic] than the social group defined in Cece [sic] v.
Holder.”182 Further, Gjura’s replacement opinion, decided after Cece’s
panel opinion was vacated and before the en banc decision, declined to
address whether young, unmarried Albanian women were a cognizable
social group.183 Judge Easterbrook noted184 that Gjura was denied
asylum mainly because the criminal conduct of a private actor does
not demonstrate that the Albanian government was unable or unwilling
to prevent persecution.185
Cece v. Holder, Rreshpja v. Gonzales, and Gjura v. Holder were
not the only occasions where the Seventh Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and
Second Circuit, respectively, considered an Albanian woman’s risk of
forced prostitution as part of a social group formulation for asylum
relief. Since Rreshpja, the Sixth Circuit has twice relied on its
reasoning in that case to not find social group cognizability of
179

Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 226.
181
Id.
182
Id. n.1. (emphasis added).
183
Gjura v. Holder, 502 Fed. App’x. 91, 92 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 2356 (2013); see Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 672 n.5 (7th. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“The
Second Circuit . . . skirted the issue of whether ‘young, unmarried Albanian women
could constitute a social group’ and found instead that the applicant, Gjura, had
failed to establish a nexus.”).
184
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 683 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
185
Gjura, 502 Fed. App’x. at 92.
180
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Albanian women fearing forced prostitution.186 The Second Circuit
was previously confronted with the issue addressed in Gjura v. Holder,
but each time the court declined to determine the cognizability of the
purported social group of the asylum applicants.187 Before the Cece
decision, the Seventh Circuit held that “young women in Albania
without male protection” from gang sex trafficking recruitment were
not cognizable because while a social group may be defined partly by
gender, the applicant’s social group formulation was defined largely by
the crime problem in Albania.188
Additionally, the Third Circuit faced a similar issue and rejected
the purported social group of “young women who have been
approached or threatened with kidnapping, forced prostitution or
killing by human traffickers that the government of Albania either
cannot or will not control,” finding the social group did not exist
absent persecution.189
While Judge Easterbrook criticized the majority’s decision as
being inconsistent with Gjura v. Holder,190 the Second Circuit might
186

Kalaj v. Holder, 319 Fed. App’x. 374, 376-77 (6th Cir. 2009) (concluding
“young, impoverished, single, uneducated women who risk kidnapping and forced
prostitution” were not a cognizable social group”); Papapano v. Gonzales, 188 Fed.
App’x. 447, 453-54 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding “women likely to be kidnapped or
forced into prostitution” were not a cognizable social group).
187
Lushaj v. Holder, 380 Fed. App’x. 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to
consider whether “young women in Albania” or “women who were previously
targeted for sex-trafficking by members of the Haklaj gang and who managed to
escape and avoid capture” formed a cognizable social group); Celaj v. Gonzales, 186
Fed. App’x. 44, 46-47 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanding to the BIA the issue of whether
“young Albanian women who fear being sold into prostitution” formed a cognizable
social group); Nilaj v. Gonzales, 205 Fed. App’x. 902, 903-04 (2d Cir. 2006)
(remanding to the BIA the issue of whether young Albanian women at risk for
abduction and forced prostitution formed a cognizable social group).
188
Lleshanaku v. Ashcroft, 100 Fed. App’x. 546, 549-50 (7th Cir. 2004).
189
Kuci v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 299 Fed. App’x. 168, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2008). In an
earlier case, the Third Circuit remanded the issue of whether “women who are
potential victims of sex trade” constituted a cognizable social group. Muca v.
Ashcroft, 116 Fed. App’x. 400, 402-03 (3d Cir. 2004).
190
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 682-82 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J.
dissenting).
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have concluded Cece was a member of a cognizable social group.
First, the initial opinion of Gjura stated “Gjura’s proposed social group
differs from, and is more amporphous [sic] than the social group
defined in Cece [sic] v. Holder.”191 As Gjura was decided before
Cece’s panel opinion was vacated, the Gjura court cited Judge
Rovner’s dissenting opinion approvingly, where Judge Rovner noted
the expert’s testimony that “the group of threatened women in Albania
is composed of women who are between the ages of sixteen and
twenty-six (perhaps twenty-seven) who live alone.”192 This means the
Second Circuit believed Cece’s purported social group was not as
amorphous as Gjura’s, hence it was more likely to constitute a
cognizable social group.
A potential problem with Gjura’s social group formulation is that
the broad and amorphous term of “young” was not defined.193 Cece’s
purported social group defined young as age sixteen to age twenty six
or twenty seven.194 The replacement Gjura opinion declined to address
whether young, unmarried Albanian women were a cognizable social
group “because Gjura failed to establish a nexus between her attacks
and her membership in a particular social group” and failed to show
that the government was unable or unwilling to protect her from
persecutors.195 If the Second Circuit decided the cognizability of
Cece’s purported social group, the court may have likewise concluded
Cece formed a cognizable social group.
The Sixth Circuit’s Rreshpja v. Gonzalez decision is contrary to
Cece v. Holder in that the purported social groups are similar, but
Rreshpja’s purported social group of young (or perceived to be
young), attractive, Albanian women at risk of forced prostitution was
191

Gjura v. Holder, 695 F.3d 223, 226 n.1 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(emphasis added), withdrawn and superseded by, 502 Fed. App’x. 91 (2d Cir. 2012).
192
Id.
193
Id. at 226-27.
194
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667 (majority opinion). Dr. Fischer, however, testified
that while that is the targeted age group, there are numerous instances of kidnapping
and trafficking outside of that age group. Id. at 673.
195
Gjura v. Holder, 502 Fed. App’x. 91, 92 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 2356 (2013).
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not cognizable,196 and Cece’s purported social group of young,
Albanian women living alone was cognizable.197 The two purported
social groups are factually distinguishable, however. First, Rreshpja
did not define young, which could have alleviated the concern that the
purported social group was broadly defined and too generalized.198
Cece’s expert, on the other hand, defined young as between the ages of
sixteen and approximately twenty seven.199 Second, Rreshpja included
the potential persecution – forced prostitution – in the social group
formulation.200 Cece did not include the potential persecution in her
purported social group, but included the characteristic of living
alone.201 Living alone was a significant factor of her vulnerability to
persecution, specifically, sex trafficking.202 As such, Cece’s social
group existed independent of the persecution,203 whereas Rresphja’s
social group was considered “circularly defined by the fact that it
suffers persecution.”204 Even if the Sixth Circuit had reached a
contrary decision on the exact same social group formulation as Cece,
the Seventh Circuit’s acknowledgment of gender plus one or more
narrowing characteristics as a legitimate method to form a social
group205 adequately addresses the concern that a social group based on
gender would be overly broad.
V.

USE OF THE GENDER PLUS ONE FORMULATION

The predominant reason the BIA and circuits are reluctant to
accept a social group defined by gender alone is the concern that too
196

Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2005).
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 674-78.
198
Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 556.
199
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667.
200
Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 556.
201
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 67-71.
202
Id. at 677-78.
203
Id.
204
Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 556.
205
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 676.
197
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many individuals would belong to a social group, and consequently
too many individuals would be asylum eligible.206 A social group
should be narrowly defined, and it may be found overbroad if it
encompasses much of the home country.207 Other elements besides
establishing membership in a particular social group, or alternatively,
one of the other four protected grounds, are required to establish
asylum eligibility. These elements include establishing (1) past
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution and (2) a
nexus between the protected ground and persecution.208 Also, the
applicant must be credible.209
Given the high burden of establishing all asylum eligibility
requirements, a broader interpretation of gender-based social groups
would not lead to an influx of asylees.210 Regardless, courts are
inclined to bypass the complex issue of social group cognizability211 or
presume social group membership and deny the asylum claim on other
grounds.212 Therefore, the social group formulation of gender plus one
would hardly increase the number of aliens granted asylum, if increase
it at all.213 Other circuits used the gender plus one formulation.214 The
206

See id. at 680 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting) (expressing the concern that the
Seventh Circuit has created precedent that everyone qualifies for social group
membership, rendering statutory asylum eligibility requirements meaningless).
207
See, e.g., Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2005).
208
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).
209
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012).
210
Randall, supra note 14, at 299.
211
See, e.g., Gjura v. Holder, 502 Fed. App’x. 91, 92 (2d Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2356 (2013).
212
See, e.g., Urbina-Dore v. Holder, 735 F.3d 952, 953 (7th Cir. 2013)
(discussing the pointlessness of the applicants arguing social group membership on
appeal because the BIA assumed they belonged to a cognizable social group and
denied asylum on other grounds).
213
See Protecting Victims, supra note 13, at 132-33 (discussing the lack of an
appreciable increase in claims based on female genital mutilation after Matter of
Kasinga); see also Chan, supra note 17, at 177 (“Although women and children
constituted the majority of [European refugee asylum-seekers post World War II],
women often faced significant difficulty leaving their countries of origin due to a
lack of financial means and other resources.”).
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formulation alleviates the concern that gender may comprise too large
a group by narrowing the group with one or more additional
characteristics besides gender.
The following cases consist solely of cognizable social group
formulations of gender plus one or more narrowing characteristics.
They are not exhaustive of all the asylum cases discussing gender in
defining a social group. Numerous decisions rejected a social group
formulated in part or in whole by gender.215 Moreover, the BIA or
circuits may have bypassed the issue of whether a purported social
group based in whole or in part on gender was cognizable if another
issue was conclusive against the applicant.216 Further, even if there
were a finding of a cognizable social group, it does not mean the
applicant was granted asylum, considering all of the other asylum
eligibility requirements that must be met.217
A.

Gender Plus Transgression of Social, Cultural, or Religious
Norms

A social group united by “ideas or practices [that] run counter to
the cultural or social convention of [their home] country . . . might
seem plausibly alterable;” however, individuals have the right to retain
characteristics fundamental to their individual identity.218 For example,
women who oppose suppressing “their core, fundamental values or
beliefs” may form a cognizable social group.219 In Fatin v. INS, the
214

E.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993).
E.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991).
216
E.g., Gjura v. Holder, 502 Fed. App’x. at 92. “As a general rule courts and
agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is
unnecessary to the results they reach.” Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v.
Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976).
217
E.g., Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241-42 (holding that while the gender plus social
group was cognizable, the applicant did not demonstrate she was a member of that
group, and thus, she could not establish persecution).
218
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 670 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
219
Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 996 (6th Cir. 2009), reh’g denied,
594 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2010).
215
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Third Circuit recognized that Iranian women who refused to conform
to the gender-specific laws and social norms of Iran formed a
cognizable social group.220 Parastoo Fatin (“Fatin”) left Iran to be
educated in the United States.221 Before entering the U.S., Fatin
participated in a political group and a women’s rights group.222 Fatin
opposed the Islamic dress code, and as a feminist, opposed gender
laws constraining women.223
Recognizing that the Acosta definition “specifically mentioned
‘sex’ as an innate characteristic that could link the members of ‘a
particular social group,’” the court stated that a social group based
solely on gender could form a cognizable social group.224 Nonetheless,
the court accepted the cognizability of Fatin’s more narrowly defined
social group formulation: women refusing to conform to genderspecific laws and social norms.225 Opposition to gender specific laws
can be so fundamental to a woman’s identity that she should not be
required to change.226 Complying with the Islamic dress code may be
so abhorrent to some women that it would constitute persecution;
however, that does not mean it would constitute persecution for all
women.227
In the Seventh Circuit decision Sarhan v. Holder, Sara Issa
Mohamad Disi (“Disi”) feared persecution due to a cultural practice.228
Disi’s sister-in-law spread a rumor in Disi’s home country of Jordan
that Disi had committed adultery.229 At the time, Disi was in the U.S.
220

Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Yadegar-Sargis v.
INS held that Christian women in Iran who opposed adhering to the Islamic female
dress code were a cognizable social group. Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 297 F.3d 596,
603 (7th Cir. 2002).
221
Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1235.
222
Id. at 1236.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 1240.
225
Id. at 1241.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 1242.
228
Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 650 (7th Cir. 2011).
229
Id. at 651.
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on a visitor visa with her family.230 The rumor spread to Disi’s
family.231 Disi’s brother believed the rumor, and Disi was informed
that her brother planned to kill her as an honor killing.232 Honor
killings are common, usually occurring “in countries where the moral
code tightly restricts women; government offers little protection for
the victims; and killers receive light punishment, if charges are not
dropped altogether.”233 Typically, the victim of an honor killing is a
female whose male relative kills the female to cleanse the family of
the reputational harm caused by the female’s immoral behavior.234
When Disi’s brother visited her in the U.S., he informed Disi that
he would murder her when she returned to Jordan.235 The court found
that Disi was a member of the cognizable social group of Jordanian
women accused of being immoral criminals due to their transgression
of social and religious norms.236 Its holding rejected the BIA’s
assertion that the members of Disi’s purported social group are only
united by the shared experience of being targets for honor killings.237
Jordanian society treats women who violate the moral code as outcasts
and permits honor killings of those women by family members.238
Moreover, women at risk of honor killings are unable “to shed the
stigmatizing characteristics that render them victims.”239 The court
noted the global plight of women by stating that “[a]long with female
genital mutilation, human trafficking and slavery, spousal rape, and
domestic battery [the practice of honor killing] is among the most
severe abuses that women face.”240
230

Id.
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Id. (citation omitted).
235
Id. at 652.
236
Id. at 654-55.
237
Id. at 655.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 662-63.
231
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Like Fatin and Sarhan, Cece transgressed social and cultural
norms by living alone in Albania. Much of Cece’s testimony before the
immigration judge focused on her status of living alone in Albania.241
Cece testified that women in Albania do not live alone, she did not
know anyone living alone, she feared living alone, and she was
targeted because she was living alone.242 Dr. Fischer’s testimony
stressed the risk facing women living alone in Albania.243 Women who
lack protection from husbands and other family members become
particularly vulnerable to traffickers in Albania.244 Analogous to
Sarhan’s transgression of social norms placing her at risk of an honor
killing,245 Cece’s stigmatizing characteristic of living alone rendered
her at a significantly higher risk of forced prostitution than the overall
population, especially because she was already targeted by a gang
leader.246
The court stated that Cece’s living situation was not alterable.247
Living alone ran counter to the social and cultural norms of Albania.
Even though the characteristic of living alone is plausibly alterable,
the court considered it a fundamental trait to one’s identity such that
she should not be required to change.248
B.

Gender Plus Ethnicity, Nationality, or Tribal Membership

The plight of women facing female genital mutilation in their
home countries has led many courts to conclude that gender plus
ethnicity, nationality, or tribal membership constitutes a cognizable

241

Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 671 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
Id.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 655.
246
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667, 670-71.
247
Id. at 673.
248
Id. at 669.
242
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social group.249 The landmark BIA decision involving female genital
mutilation is Matter of Kasinga.250 The applicant was a young member
of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe in Togo,251 where it is the normal
practice of young tribal members to undergo female genital
mutilation.252 While Kasinga’s father was alive, Kasinga was protected
from female genital mutilation.253 After her father’s death, the tribal
custom was for her paternal aunt to become the family’s primary
authority figure.254 Kasinga’s aunt forced her into a polygamous
marriage with an older man, and her aunt and new husband planned to
submit Kasinga to genital mutilation.255 She escaped Togo.256
The BIA held that Kasinga belonged to the cognizable social
group of “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have
not had [genital mutilation], as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose
the practice.”257 Two characteristics of the social group formulation
were immutable: (1) being a young woman, and (2) being a member of
the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe.258 Further, having intact genitalia is a
characteristic that “is so fundamental to the individual identity of a
young woman that she should not be required to change it.”259 At
length, the BIA discussed the pervasive problem of the practice of
249

See Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 112-13 (2d Cir. 2008), amended by, Bah
v. Mukasey, 291 Fed. App’x. 26 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d
1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005); Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007);
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 798 (9th Cir. 2005).
250
Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
251
Id. at 358.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id. at 358-59.
257
Id. at 365.
258
Id. at 366. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held in Niang v. Gonzales that
female members of the Tukulor Fulani tribe in Senegal constituted a cognizable
social group because of the immutable characteristics of gender and tribal
membership. Niang v. Gonzales 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005).
259
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. at 366.

184

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

35

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 9, Issue 1

Fall 2013

female genital mutilation in Africa, specifically in Togo, in that it is a
grave harm inflicted upon females who lack governmental protection
because the government is complicit in the practice.260 While Kasinga
was a breakthrough decision in gender-based asylum claims in that it
explicitly recognized gender as a component of a cognizable social
group, the BIA reached its decision through a restrictive analytical
route.261 Recognizing that genital mutilation is gender-based
persecution would have established precedent that gender alone can
form a social group, but instead, the BIA defined Kasinga’s social
group as gender plus tribal membership and opposition to female
genital mutilation.262
In the Ninth Circuit’s Mohammed v. Gonzales, Khadija Ahmed
Mohammed (“Mohammed”) was a member of the Benadiri clan of
Somalia.263 If removed to Somalia, Mohammed feared she would fall
victim to female genital mutilation.264 The court found that
Mohammed belonged to two cognizable social groups: (1) young girls
in the Benadiri clan and (2) Somali females.265 Somali females, a
group based on gender alone, was found cognizable due to the deeply
imbedded cultural practice of female genital mutilation in Somalia,
where approximately 98% of women underwent female genital
mutilation.266 Despite not having recognized women as a social group
previously, the court stated “the recognition that girls or women of a
particular clan or nationality (or even in some circumstances females
in general) may constitute a social group is simply a logical
application of our law."267 Moreover, the court noted that “[f]ew would
260

Id. at 366-68.
Randall, supra note 14, at 295.
262
Id.
263
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2005).
264
Id.
265
Id. at 796-97.
266
Id. at 797.; In Hassan v. Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit also concluded Somali
females constituted a cognizable social group given the prevalence of female genital
mutilation. Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007).
267
Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 797.
261
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argue that sex or gender, combined with clan membership or
nationality, is not an ‘innate characteristic,’ ‘fundamental to individual
identity.’”268 The risk of harm Mohammed faced, female genital
mutilation, occurs because the person is female and is subjected to
others’ efforts to exert control over women’s sexuality.269
Successful asylum claims in female genital mutilation cases
demonstrate how courts may manipulate the social group definition to
accommodate a claim based essentially on gender alone.270 For
example, both Kasinga271 and Mohammed272 used the term “young” in
a cognizable social group, yet numerous decision makers find the term
too amorphous.273 Gender alone could have been a cognizable social
group in Kasinga; instead, the BIA narrowed the breadth of a gender
only social group with the characteristics of tribal membership and
opposition to the practice of female genital mutilation.274 Numerous
forms of persecution are gender specific.275 Sexual violence, like
forced prostitution in Cece, disproportionately affects women.276
Decision makers tend to attribute gender-based persecution to the
backward religious, tribal, or societal customs that foster persecution
of women rather than the problem of violence against women in

268

Id.
Id. at 798 (internal quotation marks omitted).
270
Chan, supra note 17, at 180.
271
Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996).
272
Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 797.
273
See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that
“[p]ossession of a broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender will not by
itself endow individuals with membership in a particular social group.”).
274
Randall, supra note 14, at 295.
275
Id. at 285-86 (listing forms of persecution that are gender specific,
including sexual violence, genital mutilation, “dowry deaths, purdah, coerced or
forced adherence to religious dress codes and other specific customs, and the use of
mass rapes as a weapon of war”).
276
Deborah Anker, Refugee Status and Violence Against Women in the
“Domestic” Sphere: The Non-State Actor Question, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 391
(2001).
269
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general.277 The persecution women face is often related to cultural or
religious practices, so those opposing gender-based asylum presume
harms facing women are not that serious.278 But, the harms facing
women in gender-based asylum cases are human rights violations that
are not minor or trivial.279
The tendency of decision makers to distinguish non-Western
harms from Western harms is evident in Judge Easterbrook’s
dissenting opinion in Cece.280 Judge Easterbrook considered forced
prostitution a criminal act, not persecution, and declared “[p]eople are
forced into prostitution in Chicago.”281 Also, he questioned whether
Cece was at a high risk of persecution.282 Regardless, the discussion
regarding the risk of forced prostitution pertains to establishing
persecution, not a social group.
C.

Gender Plus Relationship Status

In Qu v. Holder, the Sixth Circuit held Bi Xia Qu (“Qu”) was a
member of the cognizable social group of Chinese women who have
been subjected to forced marriage and involuntary servitude.283 Qu’s
father took out a loan from Zhang that he was unable to repay.284
Zhang demanded that either the loan be repaid or that Qu become his
wife.285 Zhang also threatened to use his police and gang connections
to imprison the family if anyone reported the incident.286
277

Anita Sinha, Domestic Violence and U.S. Asylum Law: Eliminating the
“Cultural Hook” for Claims Involving Gender-Related Persecution, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1562, 1584 (2001).
278
Protecting Victims, supra note 13, at 131.
279
Id.
280
See Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 678-79 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J.
dissenting).
281
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 679 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
282
Id. at 678-79.
283
Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 607 (6th Cir. 2010).
284
Id. at 604.
285
Id.
286
Id. at 604-05.
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Subsequently, Zhang kidnapped Qu, detained her at his home,
attempted to rape her, threatened to imprison her if she did not have
sex with him or repay the debt, and threatened to cut off her hands and
feet if she tried escaping.287 After being detained at his home for about
two weeks, Qu escaped to her aunt’s house, who helped smuggle Qu
into the U.S.288 Qu feared Zhang would search for her everywhere so
that he could keep her hostage or sell her and that she was afraid the
government would harm her if she returned to China.289 In holding Qu
was a member of a cognizable social group, the court concluded the
members of the social group shared the common, immutable
characteristic of being a woman abducted by a man for forced
marriage in an area recognizing forced marriages.290
Another decision with a social group based on gender plus
relationship status was the Eighth Circuit’s Nwengwe v. Mukasey,
which held that Cameroonian widows were a cognizable social
group.291 As soon as the husband of Elizabeth Simeni Ngengwe
(“Ngengwe”) died, her in-laws detained her in their home for two
months, “shaved her head with a broken bottle, forbade her from
dressing, kept her children from her, and forced her to sleep on the
ground” in accordance with traditional mourning rituals.”292 The
family also took all of the belongings of her and her deceased husband
and closed their bank account.293 Approximately a month after
escaping with her children to her sister’s home within Cameroon, the
in-laws arrived at the home demanding Ngengwe marry her brotherin-law or pay the bride’s price.294 Ngengwe refused to marry the
brother-in-law because he was older and already had two other wives,
and Ngengwe informed them she was unable to pay the bride’s
287

Id. at 605.
Id.
289
Id.
290
Id. at 607.
291
Ngengwe v. Mukaskey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1034 (8th Cir. 2008).
292
Id. at 1031.
293
Id. at 1031-32.
294
Id. at 1032.
288
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price.295 Ngengwe’s in-laws beat her, then told her that when they
returned to her sister’s home in a month, they would kill Ngengwe and
take her children if she neither married her brother-in-law nor paid the
bride’s price.296 Ngengwe did not inform the police, believing they
would not become involved in a family matter.297
The court reasoned that Cameroonian widows shared an
immutable characteristic – the shared experience of losing a
husband.298 The court rejected the immigration judge’s contention that
Ngengwe did not have an immutable characteristic because she could
change her marital status.299 Further, the court found that Cameroonian
widows were a cognizable social group because Cameroonian society
pervasively discriminates against widows and women are subject to
mourning rituals.300
The Cece court analogized the characteristic of living alone to
relationship status.301 During Cece’s testimony, the government
attorney asked Cece why she could not find a man to marry and
protect her.302 The court stated that “this is the type of fundamental
characteristic change that [is] not ask[ed] of asylum applicants.”303
This reasoning is analogous to that of the Ngengwe court, which
rejected the immigration judge’s conclusion that Ngengwe did not
have an immutable characteristic because she could change her marital
status.304 Living alone is a plausibly alterable, but fundamental
characteristic.305

295

Id.
Id.
297
Id.
298
Id. at 1034.
299
Id.
300
Id. at 1034-35.
301
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
302
Id.
303
Id.
304
Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at 1034.
305
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 669.
296
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VI. PROPOSAL FOR GENDER-BASED SOCIAL GROUP
FORMULATIONS
A.

The Logical Fallacies of the Cece Opinion

While the court correctly found Cece’s gender plus social group
cognizable based on prior case law, the majority’s reasoning consisted
of convoluted logic. Specifically, the court stated the group members’
“age, gender, nationality, [and] living situation are not alterable.”306
Generally speaking, gender and nationality are unalterable. But, age is
an inherently changeable characteristic, and one’s living situation
changes.
The court did not discuss age beyond explaining that Cece’s
expert defined a target age group of women at risk of persecution.307
Surely one cannot volitionally alter her age, but age naturally
progresses. Judge Easterbrook and Judge Manion discussed the
fallacies of considering a changeable characteristic like age as an
immutable characteristic.308 Like many previous adjudicators, Judge
Manion criticized using young as a characteristic in a social group
because it is too amorphous and subjective.309 Cece’s expert defined
young by testifying that females between age sixteen and twenty six
are primarily targeted for forced prostitution, but others outside the
age range could also become victims.310 Judge Easterbrook opined that
Cece was not even in the social group because she is now thirty four
years old.311 For that reason, Judge Manion criticized that accepting a

306

Id. at 673.
Id.
308
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 680 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting); Cece II, 733 F.3d at
684-85 (Manion, J. dissenting).
309
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 684-85 (Manion, J. dissenting).
310
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667 (majority opinion).
311
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 678 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
307
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social group using the term “young” would make the social group
formulation malleable.312
The pervasive problem of backlogs in immigration courts affects
any social group using age as a characteristic.313 Asylum applicants
wait, often years, before they appear for a merits hearing before an
immigration judge.314 An immigration judge did not decide Cece’s
claim until approximately four years after she applied for asylum.315
This does not account for the subsequent appeals and remands of her
case. Approximately seven years passed from the date the immigration
judge first heard her case to the date of the en banc Seventh Circuit
decision.316 Cece was twenty three years old when she entered the
U.S.317 and currently is approximately thirty four years old.318 When
the immigration judge granted her asylum application in 2006, Cece
was approximately twenty six years old and within the age group
defined by her expert.319 Penalizing an applicant like Cece for aging
out of her social group creates a perverse incentive to delay
adjudication of asylum claims and the appellate process. Nevertheless,
the court emphasized her expert’s testimony that women outside the
target age group were also at risk of forced prostitution.320

312

Cece II, 733 F.3d at 685 (Manion, J. dissenting) (“Is 34 young? It depends
on whom you ask. And that is the problem with using such subjective characteristics
to define a ‘social group.’”).
313
See Ashley Huebner, Decision 2015: Chicago Asylum Applicants Waiting
Three Years to See a Judge, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER (Mar. 13,
2012), available at http://www.immigrantjustice.org/staff/blog/decision-2015chicago-asylum-applicants-waiting-three-years-see-judge.
314
Id.
315
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667 (majority opinion).
316
Id.
317
Cece I, 668 F.3d 510, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, Cece II, 733
F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
318
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 678 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
319
Cece II, 733 F. 3d at 667 (majority opinion).
320
Id. at 673.
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Likewise, the court’s finding that one’s living situation is not
alterable321 suffers from logical fallacies. The court explained that
while it is plausibly alterable, it is a fundamental characteristic.322
Judge Manion believed living alone is not immutable or fundamental
to one’s identity like relationship status.323 Similarly, Judge
Easterbrook stated that “[p]eople may marry, live with relatives, or
join forces with similarly situated persons[, and] [m]any single women
live with other single women.”324 As such, one’s living situation is
changeable.325 The differing interpretation of adjudicators regarding
what characteristics are immutable potentially dooms any purported
gender plus social group.
B.

A Proposed Interpretation of Gender-Based Social Group
Formulations

The BIA decided in Acosta that gender is an immutable
characteristic that could form a social group.326 All circuits follow the
Acosta test.327 As such, applicants should not have to prove the plus
characteristics are immutable as well. Gender alone should be the
immutable characteristic defining the social group, and the issue
should be whether the plus characteristics narrow the group

321

Id.
Id. at 669. Other than Cece continuing to live alone, nothing suggested Cece
found living alone fundamental to her identity. While the Fatin court found Iranian
women who refused to conform to gender-specific laws and social norms formed a
cognizable social group, the court concluded opposition to the gender-specific laws
was not fundamental to Fatin, and she was not granted asylum. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d
1233, 1241-42 (3d Cir. 1993).
323
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 684 (Manion, J. dissenting).
324
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 680-81 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
325
Id. at 680.
326
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled, in
part, on other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
327
See cases cited supra note 1.
322
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sufficiently so that group members can establish the nexus between
group membership and persecution.328
This approach would not bypass the requirement of establishing a
social group, as Acosta already decided gender is an immutable
characteristic.329 Nor would it bypass the nexus requirement. In Cece,
the court emphasized the significance of demonstrating a nexus
between group membership and persecution because the nexus is a
requirement for asylum eligibility and narrows the breadth of the
social group.330 The nexus cannot be analyzed completely
independently from the protected ground because identifying the
relevant protected ground “requires an examination of against whom
the harm is directed before the persecutor’s motivation for the harm is
examined.”331
C.

Increased Recognition of Gender-Based Social Groups Would
Not Open the Floodgates

The concern that increased recognition of gender-based social
groups would result in an influx of asylees is unfounded for numerous
reasons. First, numerous aliens fearing persecution cannot leave their
home countries due to a lack of financial resources.332 Second, only a
small percentage of immigrants admitted into the U.S. are asylees, so
concern regarding the number of immigrants is misplaced.333 Third,
the applicant must still establish the other procedural and evidentiary

328

See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199–1200 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
focus with respect to such claims should be not on whether either gender constitutes
a social group (which both certainly do) but on whether the members of that group
are sufficiently likely to be persecuted that one could say that they are persecuted ‘on
account of’ their membership.”); Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2006),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007) (same).
329
Acosta, 19 I. & N. at 233.
330
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 673-74 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
331
Casey, supra note 47, at 1006-07 (emphasis in original).
332
Chan, supra note 17, at 188-89.
333
Imbriano, supra note 18, at 351.
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elements to be granted asylum.334 The stringent statutory requirements
already safeguard against potentially innumerable asylum claims.335 A
woman cannot be granted asylum merely because she is a woman
unless she can establish a nexus between group membership and
persecution.336 Thus, courts should not be concerned everyone would
qualify for asylum and the narrow refugee definition would be lost if
gender were a recognized basis for a social group.337 Finally, the
concern of broadening the interpretation of social group formulations
fails to recognize that other protected grounds, specifically race,
nationality, and religion, also encompass large populations.338
Regardless, refugee status is determined on a case by case basis and
should not be affected by the fear of hypothetical asylum claims that
other women may present in the future.339
D.

Criticisms of the Gender Plus Formulation and Other
Proposals

Others have suggested proposals to ameliorate the problem of
narrow construction of gender-based social group formulations. For
example, gender could be added as a sixth protected ground in the
refugee definition.340 Congress’s historically slow movement of
immigration reform341 is reason enough to doubt the feasibility of this
334

Randall, supra note 14, at 299. The social group category “is often seen as a
gap filler, but it does not soften the requirements for asylum.” Imbriano, supra note
18, at 345.
335
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 673-74.
336
Heitz, supra note 23, at 242.
337
See Imbriano, supra note 18, at 350.
338
Randall, supra note 14, at 299.
339
See id.
340
Chan, supra note 37, at 185.
341
Mary Giovagnoli, Overhauling Immigration Law: A Brief History and
Basic Principles of Reform, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, available at
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/overhauling-immigration-law-briefhistory-and-basic-principles-reform (discussing the history and issues inhibiting
immigration reform). Also, gender as a protected ground might be over-inclusive
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proposal. Moreover, the most significant problem facing gender-based
asylum claims is the interpretation of the law, not the law itself.342
Another proposal is that courts should recognize gender as the basis of
persecution, and thus gender alone should form a cognizable group.343
But, some applicants may face difficulty meeting the nexus
requirement using this approach.344
A criticism of using the gender plus formulation is that the
applicant must establish gender as well as some other characteristic to
establish a cognizable social group, thus requiring the applicant to
“prove twice as much to meet the nexus requirement” compared to
applicants asserting other protected grounds.345 This criticism
recognizes the problem of the current interpretation of gender plus
social group formulations. Cece’s majority argued that each plus
characteristic in Cece’s social group was immutable.346 The dissenters
disagreed.347 If the proposal were accepted that gender alone is the
immutable characteristic defining the social group so the plus
characteristics do not need to be immutable as well, then the applicants
would not have to prove twice as much as applicants asserting other
protected grounds.
A related criticism is that the applicant would need to add
qualifications to narrow the purported social group significantly.348
The female applicant may need to add characteristics to her social
group formulation if she lacks evidence that the risk of persecution is
because it could include women facing economic discrimination that cumulatively
might rise to persecution; Congress did not intend to grant asylum for economic
persecution. Chan, supra note 37, at 190.
342
Sinha, supra note 278, at 1565.
343
Randall, supra note 14, at 298.
344
Barbara Barreno, In Search of Guidance: An Examination of Past, Present,
and Future Adjudications of Domestic Violence Asylum Claims, 64 VAND. L. REV.
225, 256 (2011).
345
Chan, supra note 17, at 183.
346
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 669, 673 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
347
Cece II, 733. F.3d at 681-82 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting); Cece II, 733 F.3d
at 684-85 (Manion, J. dissenting).
348
Randall, supra note 14, at 296.
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not based solely on gender.349 While some courts have recognized that
gender alone can form a cognizable social group,350 additional
characteristics may be necessary to establish a nexus. Also, additional
characteristics may be necessary to meet the particularity
requirement.351
Presumably considering Acosta, Judge Easterbrook admitted the
BIA would find Cece is a member of the cognizable social group of
Albanian women.352 He, correctly, pointed out that Cece did not argue
she would be persecuted based solely on being a woman.353 Cece
needed to add characteristics to her social group formulation to meet
the nexus requirement. Because no asylum adjudicators contest gender
is an immutable characteristic, applicants should not be penalized for
adding characteristics narrowing the breadth of a social group based
solely on gender so that they can meet the nexus requirement. The
current interpretation of gender plus social groups requires applicants
to prove the plus characteristics are immutable too. This disadvantages
applicants because the applicant must prove at least twice as much as
applicants who use one of the other protected grounds. Accordingly, a
better approach is to return to the Acosta view that gender is an
immutable characteristic354 and to not require applicants to prove that
the additional characteristics are immutable.

349

Barreno, supra note 345, at 257.
See, e.g., Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005)
(acknowledging that females might constitute a particular social group in some
circumstances and that Acosta “listed gender as an example of a prototypical
immutable characteristic that could form the basis for a social group”).
351
Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008) (“[T]he key
question is whether the proposed description is sufficiently particular, or is too
amorphous to create a benchmark for determining group membership.”) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
352
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 681 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
353
Id.
354
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled, in
part, on other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
350
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Necessity of Uniform Interpretation of the Law

Asylum officers, immigration judges, and courts have significant
discretionary power to decide claims, and that discretion contravenes
the goal of uniform application of the law and the humanitarian
purpose of asylum.355 Social group cognizability turns on arbitrary
decision making, resulting in a lack of uniformity, including circuit
splits, and uncertainty for asylum applicants.356 A circuit’s decision
only has precedential effect within the circuit.357 Thus, a gender-based
social group can be cognizable in one jurisdiction, but not another.358
Future asylum applicants like Cece will likely present a cognizable
social group in the Seventh Circuit, where Cece v. Holder has
precedential effect, but not in the Sixth Circuit, where Rreshpja v.
Gonzales has precedential effect.
The issues presented by arbitrary and discretionary decision
making of the cognizability of gender-based social group formulations
were evident in Cece. Besides the circuit split created by the decision,
the Seventh Circuit was divided on the cognizability of Cece’s social
group. Of all the possible Seventh Circuit panel combinations, Cece’s
panel comprised Judge Easterbrook and Judge Manion, who rejected
Cece’s social group formulation. Judge Rovner dissented. The
remaining Seventh Circuit judges agreed with Judge Rovner, who
wrote the en banc opinion finding Cece’s social group cognizable.359
The fate of an asylum applicant should not turn on luck.360

355

Sinha, supra note 278, at 1571.
Chan, supra note 17, at 180, 182.
357
18 JAMES WM MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.02(1)(c)
(3d ed. 2013). While another circuit’s decision is not binding, it is persuasive and
should be considered “in the interest of maintaining a reasonable uniformity of
federal law.” Id.
358
Chan, supra note 17, at 180.
359
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
360
See Chan, supra note 17, at 169 (“[T]he fate of the asylum-seeker may . . .
turn on the arbitrary discretion and decision-making authority of a single judge.”).
356
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The U.S. Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari for immigration
cases because of the availability of review by the BIA and the
appropriate circuit.361 Consequently, the BIA and circuits establish the
standards and create the trends of immigration law.362 Accepting the
proposed interpretation that gender alone should be the immutable
characteristic and the additional characteristics should not have to be
immutable would create uniformity because there would be no
subjective interpretation of whether the plus characteristics are
immutable. The plus characteristics would serve to narrow the social
group so the nexus requirement can be met.
CONCLUSION
Considering case law of the BIA and circuits, the Seventh Circuit
correctly accepted the cognizability of a social group formulation
based on gender plus other narrowing characteristics in Cece v.
Holder. Nevertheless, the court’s reasoning used the same convoluted
logic of other courts who have found gender plus social groups
cognizable.363 Historically, the narrow construction of gender-based
groups has left women unable to establish group membership.364 The
current narrow interpretation of gender-based social groups,
specifically the requirement that the plus characteristics be immutable,
inhibits the ability to establish group membership and leads to
arbitrary decision making and circuit splits.365
The gender plus formulation is considered a more limited
approach rather than recognizing gender alone as a social group
because it narrows the breadth of gender-based asylum claims.366
361

Imbriano, supra note 18, at 331-32.
Heitz, supra note 23, at 239.
363
See Randall, supra note 14, at 294.
364
Kounelias, supra note 22, at 597.
365
See Chan, supra note 17, at 180, 182.
366
Susanne J. Prochazka, There is No Honor in Honor Killings: Why Women
At Risk for Defying Sociosexual Norms Must Be Considered a “Particular Social
Group” under Asylum Law, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 445, 469-70 (2012).
362

198

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

49

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 9, Issue 1

Fall 2013

Given the other stringent requirements for asylum eligibility, broader
acceptance of gender-based social groups would not dramatically
increase the number of asylees or grant blanket asylum to women.367
Even if acceptance of gender-based social groups significantly
increased asylees, only an individual’s claim should be considered.368
While asylum relief was not intended to protect everyone fleeing
persecution, those who establish asylum eligibility should not be
stagnant.369 A uniform standard regarding interpretation of genderbased social group formulations should be created to “provide equal
protection for women suffering from gender-based persecution.”370
The Acosta decision showed promise of expanding the social group
definition to include gender as a cognizable social group.371 Returning
to the Acosta holding that gender is an immutable characteristic
defining a social group,372 the new interpretation that should be
adopted is that gender alone establishes the requisite immutable
characteristic for social group membership, and the issue should be
whether the plus characteristics narrow the group sufficiently so that
group members can establish the nexus between group membership
and persecution.373

367

Imbriano, supra note 18, at 351.
Id.
369
Id. at 358.
370
Heitz, supra note 23, at 239.
371
Randall, supra note 14, at 294.
372
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled, in part, on
other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
373
See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199–1200 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
focus with respect to such claims should be not on whether either gender constitutes
a social group (which both certainly do) but on whether the members of that group
are sufficiently likely to be persecuted that one could say that they are persecuted ‘on
account of’ their membership.”).
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